On Sunday, January 12, 2025, at 3 pm Eastern Time, Ehud Eilam, Ph.D., will be our guest for a Casual Conversation, sponsored by the Jewish Culture Group, which classmate Bruce Alpert chairs.
Dr. Eilam was suggested by classmate Jay (“Yogi”) Glaser for a Casual Conversation. Dr. Eilam is a former member of and consultant to the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”) and the author of eight books on Israel’s strategic and military options and constraints, his most recent being Israel’s New Wars: The conflicts between Israel and Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinians since the 1990s (Peter Lang 2024). From a talk he gave at a small shul in Clinton MA: “Dr. Eilam will discuss the existential dangers confronting Israel from a purely military and not a political perspective. [Emphasis added.] He will address its military strengths and weaknesses as well as those of its many surrounding hostile neighbors; its fraught relationships with its military allies including the US; and the results of its recent efforts to suppress guerrilla and terror activity in the West Bank.”
Although published after the horrific events of October 7, 2023, Dr. Eilam’s latest book necessarily has little to say in detail about the current, and ongoing, conflict, especially the successful multi-pronged war on Hezbollah, which defanged—at least for now—the substantial threat of that non-state actor (“NSA”) to Tel Aviv and the entirety of Israel though the potential use of its large cache of rockets. Dr. Eilam gives valuable context to Israel’s history in military conflict with both NSAs and Arab states from Israel’s founding ion 1948 through the multiple wars from the 1960s through the prior Hamas war and the extended occupation of part of Lebanon. “In the war of 2006 [against Hezbollah] and since then Israel had a series of wars against an NSA.” (At 143.)
Much of Dr. Eilam’s book is devoted to the changes over the decades in IDF strategy and how it has developed in response to Israel’s experience in responding to the threats it faces, seeking “to find the right combination of firepower and maneuver.” (At 149.) This is from “IDF Strategy,” as quoted in the book, id. :
“[A] pinpointed ground offensive operation will be carried out against the enemy’s centers of gravity while aspiring to reach the final lines of the fighting speedily. When these have been reached, the forces will operate to stabilize the defense lines and sanitize the area.”
As to October 7, Dr. Eilam has this to say, at 160:
. . . Israel’s forward defense failed completely on October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched a large-scale attack. The UIDF, like in former confrontations, had no depth on the border because it had to protect villages that were very close to the border. There was also no alert, shortage of troops, poor readiness, and lack of proper preparations like not laying mines across the Israeli side of the border. Israel paid dearly for those crucial mistakes.
If you wish to participate in this conversation send me an email by this Friday, January 10: arthur.fergenson@ansalaw.com .
Please join us and Dr. Eilam.